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1. Biographical Note
Dr Stephen Wright is an Associate Professor in 
Aerospace Engineering at the University of West of 
England (UWE), UK, with a specialism in Avionics 
and Aircraft Systems. Prior to joining UWE, he spent 
25 years as a software, electronics and systems 
engineer in the electronics and aerospace industry 
(Rolls-Royce, ST Microelectronics, and Airbus). His 
research now focuses on development of avionics 
and support systems for small (i.e. sub-7kg) 
Unmanned Air Vehicles (sUAV).
2. Abstract
This document responds to a request for evidence 
made by the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee on March 7th, 2019, seeking 
to inform an inquiry into the “ethical and safety 
implications of the growing use of civilian drones, of 
all sizes, across the UK”.
Based on literature review and practical experience 
of the author in the field of novel sUAV 
development, the document seeks to provide 
background commentary on the current state of 
technology and practice in the field of sUAVs and 
relate this to the inquiry objectives.
3. Summary
 sUAVs may be regarded as presenting a spectrum 
of threats: ranging from high-volume/low-
exposure through to and low-volume/high-
exposure
 The common perception of sUAV threats is 
accidental and reckless incidents using 
commercial airframes.
 Proposed legislation anticipates these perceived 
capabilities, but overlooks those already 
available to skilled developers
 A salient risk is malicious deployment of 
improvised weaponised sUAVs, which will not 
be countered by legislation and requires active 
policing and countermeasures
 Proposed registration legislation will help to 
greatly reduce accidental threats and partially 
reduce reckless threats.
 Attention should be paid to the possible 
unintended consequences of legislation, 
particularly technology adaptation to circumvent 
it, and constraints placed on sanctioned UAV 
research and policing
4. Summary of Subject Matter Expertise
Dr Wright has established a group of staff based at 
UWE’s Frenchay Bristol campus, developing a range 
of enabling technologies and practical applications 
for sUAVs. The group develops equipment of 
suitable maturity for enabling further technology 
investigation and demonstration. As part of the UWE, 
the group provides a variety of relevant expertise and 
resources for aerospace design, development, 
manufacture, and test flight. 
The group has completed, or has in progress, sUAV 
development projects for a variety of commercial and 
research customers: 
 MBDA UK Ltd 
 UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
 Atlantic Area European Regional 
Development Fund (INTERREG)
 UK Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (Dstl)
 IrvinGQ
 Leonardo Helicopter Division (LHD)
 Samad Aerospace
 MTJB Ltd
 UWE Department of Engineering, Design and 
Mathematics
A variety of sUAVs have been developed and flight-
tested:
 “Agile”: demonstration of high-acceleration 
multi-rotor flight (MBDA)
 “Jackdaw”: investigation of long-endurance 
autonomous fixed-wing flight (MBDA)
 “SpeedRacer”: demonstration of fixed-wing 
autonomous target interception (MBDA)
 “Spectre”:  sub-scale demonstrator of future 
multi-rotor/fixed-wing tilt-rotor (MBDA)
 “Stonefish”: multi-rotor self-recovering 
surveillance station (MoD)
 “Thunderbird”: rapidly reconfigurable multi-
rotor vehicle (MTJB)
 “Wonderbot”: programmable multi-rotor for 
undergraduate teaching (UWE)
 “Albatross”: demonstration of product design 
multi-rotor (UWE)
 “Offshore UAV”: aerial inspection of off-
shore wind turbines (INTERREG)
 “TRED”: demonstration of tactical multi-rotor 
usage (Dstl)
The group has also completed, or has in progress, 
multiple sUAV analysis projects:
 Avionics architecture for airborne artificial 
intelligence (MBDA)
 Ducted fan efficiency analysis (LHD)
 Safety Argument Structures for Autonomous 
Systems (Dstl)
 Open Architectures for future UAVs (Dstl)
 Flight controls for future VTOL aircraft 
(Samad) 
5. Commercial environment
The sUAV industry is currently following the 
familiar economic trajectory of a nascent technology 
being initially exploited by small enterprises, 
followed by the consolidation and backing from 
larger corporations needed to advance. Despite the 
fragmented nature of the industry, many sUAV 
technologies are governed by a variety of emerging 
standards established collectively by the development 
community. Thus, to some extent sUAV technology 
may be regarded as following the same unorganised 
(or self-organised) model of previous knowledge-
based technologies. 
The partially matured nature of the industry is 
illustrated by the categories of product available in 
the sUAV market: two overlapping classes are 
defined here: Custom and Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS). 
Custom sUAVs are constructed by technically skilled 
amateurs and niche commercial manufacturers, using 
a variety of available components and sub-systems. 
Conversely, COTS (“shrink-wrapped”) sUAVs are 
produced by larger commercial enterprises, 
employing mass-production of airframes and using 
proprietary systems and software. An intersection of 
the Custom and COTS markets exists in the “Ready 
To Fly” (RTF) niche in which small commercial 
suppliers provide pre-assembled Custom equipment.
The Custom approach offers greater flexibility and 
performance for a given price point. Conversely, the 
expertise and economies of scale offered by COTS- 
developed equipment offer greater sophistication, 
reliability, and ease of operation for unskilled 
operators The proliferation of sUAVs has been 
almost entirely driven by this COTS segment [4].
The early industrial consolidation and the resulting 
technical sophistication of COTS UAVs is well 
illustrated by the products of the DJI company of 
Shenzhen, China (shown in Figure 1 & Figure 2). 
Figure 1: DJI Phantom Quadcopter
Figure 2: DJI Mavic Quadcopter
The success of DJI’s products (particularly the 
Phantom and Mavic sUAVs illustrated) has 
established the company as the world’s leading 
sUAV vendor and enabled the rapid expansion of the 
DJI company from approximately 90 employees at its 
creation in 2006, to approximately 4000 when the 
Mavic was introduced in 2016 [3]. The proliferation 
of DJI products has served to define public 
perception of the capabilities (and limitations) of 
sUAVs in general.
6. Technological Environment
Classes of technology that have arisen to enable 
sUAV proliferation are classified here by the 
functions that they contribute to the vehicle’s 
operation: Propulsion, Stabilisation and Control, 
Command and Navigation, and Communications. 
Propulsion refers to the generation of thrust capable 
of being modulated with sufficient agility to allow 
controlled flight. Stabilisation and Control refers to 
sensing and control of vehicle stability: this category 
does not include accurate control of position, 
implying a need for a higher level of automatic or 
manual piloting to maintain and alter position. 
Command and Navigation (explicitly distinct from 
Stabilisation and Control) relates to all functions 
necessary to move between selected positions and 
hold station to accomplish a mission. Automation of 
this category relegates a human controller to a 
supervisory or management role and enables fully 
autonomous flight if desired. Communications relates 
to provision of sufficient air-to-ground 
communication to allow such piloting or mission-
management.
For each of these categories, the current state of the 
art has been enabled by the convergence of several 
separate low-cost technologies developed for other 
consumer applications, particularly the smart-phone 
industry [5].
In the Propulsion domain, batteries using gel-
polymer electrolytes (“Lithium Polymer”) offer high 
energy-densities and high power-delivery compared 
to conventional alkali batteries. These improvements 
in energy and power density are made accessible by 
electronically commutated motors via 
microprocessor-controlled switching equipment. The 
availability of LiPo technology has enabled the 
development of electrically powered thrust-borne 
vehicles with practical flight endurance: conversely, 
applications and capabilities of sUAVs are now 
largely constrained by the limits of this same 
technology. 
In the Stabilisation and Control domain, automatic 
stabilisation avionics have been made possible by 
low-cost gyroscope and accelerometers, small 
format-factor microprocessors, and open-source 
stabilisation software [1]. Development has been 
accelerated by the availability of open-source 
software development tools. 
In the Command and Navigation domain, vehicle-
mounted First-Person View (FPV) cameras, Global 
Position System (GPS) receivers, and open-source 
implementations of autonomous GPS navigation 
algorithms have provided high-level mission-
management capabilities. Low-cost and low-weight 
sensing equipment and cameras have allowed 
mission tasks to be expanded. 
In the Communications domain, relatively short 
range (i.e. sub three kilometre) digital 
communication links with ground equipment include 
low-bandwidth command and instrumentation 
equipment operating in the unlicensed Low Power 
Device and Industrial, Scientific, and Medical 
spectra. The domain has been further enhanced by 
the availability of flat-screen monitors and goggle-
mounted display equipment, enabling portable 
screens and Head-up Displays (HUD) to be 
integrated into command equipment appropriate for 
in-field use.
The consumer-market origins of these technologies 
imply several strengths and weaknesses in relation to 
conventional manned aircraft, which frequently run 
counter to intuitive expectations. For example, due to 
advances in the Propulsion domain, accelerations of 
up to 10g and maximum airspeeds beyond 100 mph 
are achievable by vehicles costing less than £500. 
Conversely, position control via inertial-based 
methods is highly problematic, necessitating a variety 
of complex compensation technologies to accurately 
maintain station. 
Significantly, the use of consumer grade hardware 
and software and simple architectures yield low 
reliability in both availability (assurance of 
commanded operation) and integrity (prevention of 
uncommanded operation), and vehicle-loss failure 
rates of the order of 100 hours is typical. 
7. Threat analysis
7.1. Classes of threat 
Three overlapping classes of threat implied by 
current sUAV technology are defined here, judged by 
the intentions of the human operator: Accidental, 
Reckless, and Malicious. These classes have been 
popularly described as “The Clueless, The Careless, 
and The Criminal”.
Accidental threat covers those due to reasonable 
operator error or (more frequently) technical failure. 
Reckless covers threats due to illegal controlled 
flight, and accidental excursions due to insufficient 
operator training or experience. Malicious covers 
threats due to deliberate action by the operator, often 
implying some level of mission-specific modification 
to the vehicle itself.
7.2. The spectrum of threats
As discussed in Section 7.1, the boundaries of these 
classes of threat are not distinct, and each cover a 
range of activities and levels of sophistication. 
Example scenarios based on the author’s experience 
and in escalating level of severity are cited here:
7.2.1. Controlled privacy intrusion (Malicious)
Targeted observation of members of the public. 
Motivations may include journalism, espionage, or 
abusive observation.
7.2.2. Propulsion-loss in public space (Accidental)
Loss of thrust causing impact in a populated space. 
Typical causes may be switching device failure, 
computer hardware failures, battery depletion, and 
mechanical failure of wiring and connectors.
7.2.3. Fly-away in public space (Accidental)
Controlled but unnavigated “fly-away”, causing a 
vehicle to impact in a remote public space. Typical 
causes may be software failure or loss of 
communications.
7.2.4. Contraband smuggling (Malicious)
Deliberate delivery of contraband by an operator. 
Typical applications may be smuggling into prisons.
7.2.5. Deliberate proximity flying (Reckless)
A UAV being deliberately navigated close to a 
sensitive area, triggering an emergency response. 
Typical events may include unskilled observation 
missions near motorways and airports.
7.2.6. Improvised weaponisation (Malicious)
Deployment of improvised weapons developed from 
COTS or Custom airframes by skilled ameteurs (as 
discussed in Section 5). Examples of this have been 
observed in recent years during conflicts in the 
Middle East (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Improvised Weaponisation of Consumer 
UAV 
7.2.7. Military-sponsored weaponisation (Malicious)
Deployment of nationally-funded but comparatively 
low-cost weapons developed from Custom airframes 
by experts (Section 5). Examples of this are currently 
under development by a variety of nations.
7.3. Threat Severity/Probability Trade-off
In common with common Risk Assessment 
methodology, the severity of a threat’s outcome may 
be plotted against its probability of occurrence. 
Figure 4 shows such a qualitive plot for the example 
scenarios cited in Sections 7.2.1 - 7.2.7.
Figure 4: Event Severity/Probability
As implied by their position on the horizontal axis, 
actual incidents are dominated by accidental 
(occurring in public spaces on an almost daily basis 
but rarely reported), then reckless (with a few cases 
annually, and typically reported), and then malicious 
events (with no violent incidents currently reported in 
the UK). 
8. Commentary on inquiry objectives
In this section, the previous observations and analysis 
are related to the Committee’s stated issues of 
interest:
8.1. Citizen safety
“The ethical implications of civilian drones on citizen 
privacy and safety in the UK”
As shown in Figure 4 of Section 7.3, UAVs present a 
wide spectrum of potential scenarios, which trade off  
low-severity and high-probability against high-
severity and low-probability. This is the dilemma of 
any defensive strategist facing a range of dissimilar 
threats: selection of the domains to address. 
Currently proposed legislation appears to focus on 
the high-severity/low-probability domain, whether as 
a reaction to reported incidents or due to these being 
issues most amenable to legislative solutions. This 
class of threat is currently overemphasized.
As also implied by Figure 4, a salient threat is 
improvised weaponisation (Section 7.2.6), combining 
a relatively high probability (due to ease of 
development and deployment), and high severity of 
outcome (i.e. feasibility of multiple deaths of 
uninvolved members of the public in a public space, 
resulting in a disproportionate response).
8.2. Built-in safety features
“The effectiveness of built-in drone safety features, 
such as tracking and monitoring capabilities, in 
mitigating the risks of civilian drones”
Currently available built-in safety features are 
generally limited to geo-fencing, in which the vehicle 
monitors its own geographical location via on-board 
GPS capability and actively limits its flight path 
against an on-board database of prohibited locations. 
Although effective when successfully deployed, the 
concept is reliant on technical expertise of the 
developer and cooperation of the operator. In practice 
the capability is limited to COTS and more advanced 
Custom UAVs (Section 5). The commonality 
inherent in COTS equipment has also resulted in geo-
fencing override (“jailbreaking”) tools becoming 
widely available to skilled amateurs.
Although not currently contributing directly to risk 
mitigation, internal logging of flight-path recording, 
currently implemented on most COTS and Custom 
UAVs, has the future potential to enforce good 
practice by provision of evidence of adherence to 
correct procedures.
8.3. Countermeasures
“The effectiveness of anti-drone technology in 
mitigating the risks of civilian drones”
Currently available countermeasures are largely 
based on ground-based jamming of ground/air 
communications, disruption of electronics by 
Electro-Magnetic Pulse, and cyber-level interception 
of command signals. These approaches are currently 
feasible due to the technology limitations (Section 6) 
and the general use of COTS equipment (Section 5). 
However, these methods may already be evaded by 
capabilities available to skilled developers: for 
example, fully autonomous flight with no 
requirement for ground/air links, hardening of 
electronics against EMP attack, high-speed flight (i.e. 
80-100mph, 5-8g), and swarm deployment of 
vehicles.
It is probable that future countermeasures will rely on 
a combination of effectors, both ground-based and 
airborne. For example, the feasibility of low-cost, 
low-kinetic, non-impact vehicles, derived from drone 
technology and able to deploy these effectors safely 
in civilian environments, are being explored (Section 
4).
8.4. Economic opportunities
“The economic opportunities arising from the growth 
of drone technology”
As discussed in Section 5, the global UAV industry 
is experiencing geometric growth, driven largely by 
small-scale entrepreneurs. UK businesses are 
succeeding in the market, leveraging existing 
aerospace and consumer electronics expertise, and 
led by small enterprises (commercial and academic). 
Conversely, both in the UK and abroad, large 
aerospace incumbents are struggling to adapt and 
integrate rapidly evolving technologies into their 
traditionally cautious business and development 
cycles.
8.5. Regulatory frameworks
“The success, or otherwise, of regulatory frameworks 
for civilian drones and what should be covered in the 
forthcoming Drones Bill”
Evidence has been requested to inform “A Bill to 
require drones to be marked and registered and to 
broadcast certain information electronically; to place 
restrictions on drone flight near aerodromes; and for 
connected purposes.” In practice, these are distinct 
requirements, and should be addressed separately. 
“Broadcast certain information electronically”: as 
with the currently available safety measures 
discussed in Section 8.2, this requirement will require 
cooperation of both vendors and operators. It is likely 
to be resisted due to weight, cost, and reliability 
issues, and the requirement for technological 
development and investment.
“Place restrictions on drone flight near aerodromes;”: 
these requirements can be met by the simple 
extension of simple extension of current legislation 
[1].
Generally, the proposals are driven by the current 
state of UAV technology and the limits of its 
capabilities, and require the cooperation of the 
regulated parties and, even with full collaboration, 
may be difficult to implement. 
Currently proposed regulation will greatly reduce 
accidental and deter some reckless behaviour 
(Section 7). Conversely, it is likely to exacerbate the 
risk of successful malicious attacks, due to the 
constraints on sanctioned UAV research and 
deployment of countermeasures.
8.6. Planned registration
“The plans for registration of civilian drones in the 
UK”
Limited legislation (e.g. registration) is generally 
welcomed by the skilled community, motivated by a 
desire to avoid draconian legislation in reaction of a 
catastrophic accidental/reckless event.
Adaptation in reaction to legislation should be 
anticipated. For example, it is feasible to greatly 
extent the capability of sub-250g UAVs, and this 
process has already begun in anticipation of planned 
registration requirements (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Custom 136g UAV
8.7. Safety education and research
“The current state of drone safety education and 
research in the UK”
The UK has supported a self-policing sUAV 
community for many decades, limited to skilled 
amateurs by technology capability. However, the 
ease of accessibility and operation of UAVs in the 
last ten years has given rise to many accidental 
threats (Section 7.1). Media coverage in the last two 
years has done much to raise awareness of an ethical 
responsibility amongst unskilled operators. 
Commercial operation of UAVs is also efficiently 
regulated by “Permission for commercial operation” 
(PFCO) certification, and its attendant insurance 
requirements. This has in turn resulted in the 
emergence of an efficient and informed UAV 
insurance industry.
In the Research and Development domain, clarity is 
now emerging over classification boundaries between 
recreation, research, and commercial operations, and 
the appropriate controls that apply.
In the malicious domain, the threat is democratised 
by skilled amateurs developing Custom sUAVs, and 
with access to modest funding, as illustrated by the 
activities described in Section 3.
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